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Abstract Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) is a treat-
ment involving the implantation of electrodes into the
brain. Presently, it is used for neurological disorders
like Parkinson’s disease, but indications are expand-
ing to psychiatric disorders such as depression,
addiction and Obsessive Compulsive Disorder
(OCD). Theoretically, it may be possible to use DBS
for the enhancement of various mental functions. This
article discusses a case of an OCD patient who felt
very happy with the DBS treatment, even though her
symptoms were not reduced. First, it is explored if the
argument that ‘doctors are not in the business of
trading happiness’, as used by her psychiatrist to
justify his discontinuation of the DBS treatment,
holds. The relationship between enhancement and
the goals of medicine is discussed and it is concluded
that even though the goals of medicine do not set
strict limits and may even include certain types of
enhancement, there are some good reasons for
limiting the kind of things doctors are required or
allowed to do. Next, the case is discussed from the
perspective of beneficence and autonomy. It is argued
that making people feel good is not the same as
enhancing their well-being and that it is unlikely—
though not absolutely impossible—that the well-being
of the happy OCD patient is really improved. Finally,
some concerns regarding the autonomy of a request
made under the influence of DBS treatment are
considered.
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Introduction
Deep brain stimulation (DBS) is a treatment involving
the surgical implantation of two or more electrodes of
about 1.27 mm diameter, which send electrical
impulses to specific parts of the brain. DBS has been
used successfully in the treatment of neurological
illnesses such as Parkinson’s disease, tremor and
dystonia. To date more than 35,000 patients around
the world have had DBS electrodes implanted for
these conditions [1]. DBS is currently also being
explored as a treatment for psychiatric disorders such
as major depression and obsessive-compulsive disor-
der (OCD). So far, only a very limited number of
patients worldwide have received experimental DBS
therapy for psychiatric disorders. Since 1999 about 60
to 100 OCD patients have been treated with DBS, and
in February 2009 the FDA approved a DBS device
for chronic and severe OCD under the Humanitarian
Device Exemption program [1, 2]. For the near future
it is likely that application of DBS will expand to
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and addiction. Moreover, it might even turn out to be
possible to use it to enhance cognitive functioning,
mood, or other mental functions, a prospect that raises
significant controversy [4, 10].
Presently, DBS mainly raises neuroethical con-
cerns regarding the protection of vulnerable research
subjects, especially in experiments with psychiatric
patients, and concerning the side effects of the
treatment [2, 3]. Side effects of DBS depend on the
target sites and indication, and include speech
disturbances, memory impairment, aggression, (hy-
po)mania, hypersexuality, depression and increased
suicide risk [5, 6]. It also has the ability to change
certain aspects of a patient’s personality and behavior.
Neurosurgeons Gabriels and Nuttin, for example,
describe a case of a 39 year old woman who suffered
from OCD. A week after the start of the stimulation
the changes in her behavior were so marked that her
parents concluded: “If she had made a pilgrimage, we
would have thought a miracle had happened” [7]. To
date, there has been little systematic research into
these effects on personality and behavior. Only a
small number of authors have discussed the ethical
implications of the potential effects of DBS on
personality of patients, on their behavior and their
sense of self. It is generally concluded that these
effects can be quite serious and may not have been
recognized sufficiently enough until recently. Glan-
non discusses how the physiological benefits of DBS
(in the case of neurological disorders) should be
weighed against the psychological harm [8]. Bell and
Racine also discuss a number of effects on cognition,
behavior and the ‘self’ and state that these have not
received broad attention yet, but point to an important
set of issues concerning personhood, narrative and
identity [9]. They rightly conclude that more research
into the cognitive, behavioral and personality effects
is needed. Synofzik and Schlaepfer point out that
effects on personality are often too easily classified as
risks or unwanted side effects [10]. The fear that DBS
will change one’s personality or personal identity
seems to be paramount.
It is clear that DBS can have unexpected and
unwanted side effects, not only physical but also
psychological. In this article I will discuss a case in
which the psychological side-effects were unexpected
but were actually welcomed by the patient. I will
discuss the case of an OCD patient who felt really
happy with the DBS treatment, even though her
symptoms were not reduced. I will discuss how
doctors should deal with this phenomenon and
explore how this relates to the potential for DBS to
be used for human enhancement.
The Case of the Happy OCD Patient
In an interview with a Dutch newspaper Damiaan
Denys, psychiatrist and pioneer in the application of
DBS for psychiatric disorders, describes some of the
dilemmas he encounters in his work with DBS
treatment for patients who suffer from Obsessive
Compulsive Disorder. He recounts: “This is an
example from our practice: we operated on a young
woman. Her compulsive complaints do not diminish
directly after the procedure. However, with those
specific stimulation settings, she suddenly did feel
very happy. She said: ‘could you please leave the
settings as they are now, because I finally feel well!’ I
answered: ‘I am sorry, but my job is to rid you of your
complaints, not to make you happy. I’ll put the device
off.’ This may sound harsh, but I feel that as a
profession we should not wander off on such a
dangerous road. This would imply that we were in
the business of trading happiness, instead of the relief
of suffering.” [11] Denys’ main argument in this case
was that the treatment team did not succeed in finding
the right stimulator parameters to relieve the symp-
toms of this patient. The patient felt better and happier
but the objective symptoms of her OCD were not
diminished. Therefore, Denys argued, the goals of the
treatment were not achieved and so the stimulator was
turned off.
One of the moral questions this case raises it
whether or not the psychiatrist was right in turning off
the device. Or, as Denys formulates it elsewhere:
“What attitude will the doctor take when a patient
feels fine with a certain adjustment but the symptoms
have not decreased objectively?” [1: 427] If unex-
pected changes occur in a patient’s disposition,
emotional state or personality, and the patient favors
these effects and requests the doctor to keep them,
what should the doctor do? One could easily imagine
other similar cases. What if, for example, a patient
who is experimentally treated for obesity suddenly
finds that with a certain setting of the DSB, his
memory and learning abilities have improved (as in
[12]) and asks his doctor to maintain the experimental
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treatment for this reason? What if the patient
experiences and appreciates a sense of “sudden
calmness or lightness,” or a “sense of heightened
awareness, increased interest and connectedness”
(as in [13])?
The next question presenting itself would be
whether patients or even healthy people could request
a DBS treatment to have such effects brought about
on purpose, and whether doctors should or should not
comply with such requests. This raises a whole set of
questions that are well-known from the debate on
human enhancement. Although at present it may not
seem a realistic option to use DBS for enhancement
purposes [10], two considerations ought to be taken
into account. First, even though researcher may not
aim at the development of this technology for
enhancement purposes, as in other fields, e.g. cogni-
tion enhancing drugs or anti-ageing medicine, en-
hancement of healthy people may become possible as
a spin-off from clinical research [14]. In fact, the
above mentioned examples are illustrations of this.
Second, even though at first sight the invasiveness
and risks involved in a DBS procedure may seem to
be conclusive arguments against ‘frivolous’ use for
enhancement, it should be taken into consideration
that technological developments go fast [37]. Minia-
turization and the use of nanomedicine may reduce
the operation risks of DBS, while ongoing research
into the functions of specific brain areas will probably
reduce the unwanted side-effects of the treatment.
Therefore, it is wise to keep these potential future
uses in mind in discussing the present case of the
happy OCD patient.
To Treat, Not to Enhance
The first argument that can be advanced in favor of
turning off or taking out the stimulator in the case of
the happy OCD patient, is the argument given by
Denys: as doctors, our goal is to cure disease or
alleviate symptoms, not to promote happiness. It
would be a dangerous road to take, if doctors would
start ‘trading happiness’ instead of dealing with health
and illness. In a more general form this argument says
that doctors should limit themselves to treating
disease and not wander beyond that into the realm
of enhancement. This is also the stance of some
professional groups and guidelines. An ethics code
drafted by the Neuromodulation Society [16:519]
fiercely declines the use of DBS for enhancement
purposes. It states that: “the surgery should be
performed only to restore normal function and relieve
patients’ distress and suffering.”
Much has been written already on the difficulties
of maintaining a strict distinction between treatment
and enhancement. If enhancement is defined as
“improving form and function beyond what is
necessary to restore or sustain good health” [15:29]
enhancement and treatment become two separate
things by definition. A problem with this definition
is that it relies on concepts of health and disease that
are contested themselves. Moreover, most theories of
health and disease agree that definitions of disease
involve normative considerations and are therefore
not ‘objective’ and morally neutral [17, 18]. While
one can give examples of cases that clearly involve
treatment of disease and restoration of health (e.g.
chemotherapy for cancer) and others that clearly
involve the enhancement of healthy people (e.g.
cosmetic surgery), there are also interventions that
are more ambiguous and not so easy to classify, like
the use of growth hormone in children of short
stature, or the treatment of shift-work induced sleep
problems with modafinil. In this so-called grey area it
is difficult to say where and how to draw a line
between treatment and enhancement. However, the
fact that practical concepts such as health and disease
always have fuzzy boundaries, does not nullify the
meaning of the distinction altogether. The fact that
there is a penumbra between day and night does not
mean that day and night are useless concepts, nor that
we cannot distinguish between the two. The same
goes for disease and health, and for treatment and
enhancement. In a general way, we can distinguish
between treating disease or enhancing healthy people,
although borderline cases may remain contested.
The point of making a distinction between treat-
ment and enhancement, however, is not merely
descriptive. The distinction is often used in a
normative sense, to try to determine what falls on
either side of the line between good and bad, between
what doctors ought to do and what they should not
do, and between what should be reimbursed in a
collective healthcare scheme and what by individuals
themselves. As has already been pointed out by
various authors, descriptive classifications of treat-
ment and enhancement cannot do this normative
work. Judgements about the moral acceptability of
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certain interventions cannot be made by solely
referring to their status as either treatments or
enhancements; other arguments are needed. Some
definitions of enhancement therefore try to avoid the
contrast with therapy or treatment. If enhancement is
defined as ‘improvement’ [19, 20], treatment becomes
simply one form of enhancement, and it becomes
difficult to see why there would be anything morally
wrong with enhancements per se. However, this move
does not solve the question of whether specific
enhancements are morally good or bad or, phrased
differently, whether specific interventions really count
as improvements. Nor does it answer the question of
what type of improvements doctors should or should
not be involved in. In order to give answers to those
questions we need independent arguments.
Goals of Medicine
The argument against continued treatment of the
happy OCD patient can also be formulated as a
statement regarding the goals of medicine: promoting
happiness is not—and should not be—one of the
goals of medicine, and therefore doctors should not be
concerned with it. If a treatment fails to alleviate
symptoms or cure disease, it should be abandoned,
even if it improves certain aspects of the patient’s life.
The type of improvements that physicians should be
concerned with are those that have to do with health
and not with other aspects of life.
On a plausible account of the goals of medicine,
these include the cure of maladies, the relief of
suffering caused by maladies, and the promotion of
health [21].1 Whether or not promoting happiness can
somehow be part of the goals of medicine thus
defined depends on the concepts of disease, malady
and health used. According to the theories of Boorse
and Daniels, for example, health is understood as
species typical normal functioning and the goal of
medicine is to restore the patient to normal function-
ing. If we grant that obsessive-compulsive behaviour
is indeed a form of deviation from normal function-
ing, then according to this theory, treatment clearly
falls within the goals of medicine. However, making a
patient happier without curing the disease, diminish-
ing the symptoms and restoring the patient to normal
functioning equally clearly falls outside of them.
Other current theories of health and disease are not
so unambiguous, however. The theory of health as
proposed by Nordenfelt, states that: “a person is
completely healthy if and only if he is in a physical
and mental state which is such that he or she is able to
realize all his or her vital goals given a set of accepted
circumstances” [22:6].
This broader definition makes health dependent on
the “vital goals” of the person him or herself and thus
allows for considerable subjectivity in determining
what counts as health and what belongs to the goals
of medicine. If being happy belongs to the vital goals
in the OCD patient’s life—and this is not such a
strange or unusual goal—then a medical intervention
that makes her happy may contribute to her health.
This definition has the potential to draw many
‘enhancements’ into the realm of medicine. This can
be illustrated by the example of Lily, the athlete who
has a vital goal of becoming an accomplished high-
jumper but does not succeed [23]. On Nordenfelt’s
definition she would be unhealthy and giving her
enhancing drugs or muscle strengthening gene-
therapy would then constitute a treatment and
therefore belong to the goals of medicine.
An even wider definition of health is the one
employed by the WHO that understands health as a
condition of ‘complete physical, mental and social
well-being’. This definitions has been widely criti-
cized for including too much in the concept of health
and thus extending the medical domain to cover all of
life. This definition seems to imply that happiness is a
part of health and therefore doctors should promote
happiness when and where they can. It might even be
concluded that this implies that the happy OCD
patient is healthier than she was before even though
her disorder has not been cured and her symptoms
persist. Therefore, it might be argued, the DBS
treatment in this case fits the goals of medicine.
Actually, holding on to this definition of health,
almost any enhancement would fit the goals of
medicine.
It is therefore not self-evident that the goals of
medicine exclude the promotion of happiness; on the
contrary, the quality of life and the well-being of the
patient are central values in medicine, and definitions
1 According to Bengt Brülde [24], there are two underlying
‘final goals’ of medicine. The first is to save and prolong life,
and the second is to improve the quality of life. The other goals
of medicine are ‘instrumental’, that is, medicine should only try
to realize these goals when they are expected to have positive
effects on the length and/or quality of life.
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of health that go beyond strict biological criteria
appear to allow for at least some ‘enhancements’.
Can the Goals of Medicine Set limits?
In the literature on enhancement, it is frequently
argued that the ‘goals of medicine’ are not suitable as
a normative guideline or criterion in determining what
physicians should or should not engage in. First, it is
argued, a clear unambiguous and universally agreed
upon set of goals does not exist. This is true, but it is
also true that we do have some articulations of goals
of medicine that are rather widely accepted [21, 24].
These goals should not be understood as providing a
set of strict and uncontroversial criteria to judge all
specific interventions or individual cases, but they
should be used as point of departure for an ongoing
normative discussion on what we want medicine to be
and to do. In this sense, they can give some guidance.
Secondly, it is often argued that it is already
common practice for doctors to use their knowledge
and skills for not strictly medical ends. They prescribe
beta blockers for people with stage fright, they
perform body modifications for aesthetic reasons
and they perform abortions, for example. We do
already allow things like circumcisions, cosmetic
surgery, or the use of growth hormone for non-
medical reasons and mostly leave it to the discretion
of individual physicians to decide whether or not to
engage in such activities. Therefore, it could be
argued, it would be inconsistent not to allow doctors
to use DBS if patients—or even healthy people—
requested it for purposes they value, assuming it
would be reasonably safe and effective. The argu-
ment that physicians should only use DBS for
‘strictly medical’ purposes is therefore untenable, it
can be argued. However, the fact that doctors
already do some things that may fall outside the
goals of medicine, does not prove that this is right.
There are still moral discussions going on about,
for example, the role of doctors in cosmetic surgery
or non-medical circumcision.2
This indicates again that the goals of medicine are
not a fixed set of criteria, but rather form a field of
normative discussion in which notions like health,
disease and well-being or quality of life are central
concepts. It is important to understand that the ‘goals
of medicine’ are not static; they are not written in
stone but are instead changeable and adaptable,
although the core values remain rather constant. So,
even if certain enhancements or improvements would
not be considered to belong to the goals of medicine
at present, this might change over time. We can, for
example, currently witness a cautious shift regarding
the acceptance of neuro-enhancements: the Ethics,
Law and Humanities committee of the American
Academy of Neurology has stated that neuro-
enhancements do not fall within the core goals of
medicine, but are nevertheless acceptable and do not
undermine the profession’s core values [38]. Brody
and Miller speak of evolution of the so called ‘internal
morality’ of medicine. “Our evolutionary view of the
internal morality of medicine makes a somewhat
complicated debate mandatory, since one cannot
enjoy the luxury of simple reading off the conclusions
of the IMM from a fixed Platonic essence of
medicine’s goals and duties” [25: 595].
An important question is who gets a say in
determining how the goals of medicine should evolve
and how they should be adapted to the challenges of
new technological possibilities and societal change
[26, 27]. Should this be the privilege of the medical
profession itself? Should the medical profession
follow society’s demand? I believe medicine is part
of and intertwined with society and societal goals and
values. There is a strong interaction between medical
professional ethics and the common morality in
society but the profession can and should bring its
own perspective, experiences and core values to this
discussion.
Although some enhancements may well fall (or
come to fall) within the goals of medicine, there are, I
believe, some good reasons for limiting the kind of
things doctors are allowed or required to do. The most
important moral limit lies of course in the best interest
of the patient which should always be protected and
served. A second important moral consideration is
that of justice. Since medical skills and knowledge are
scarce resources, they ought to be used fairly and not
squandered on frivolous goals. While some non-
medical ends that require medical skills may be worth
pursuing, others may not. This means that we should
look for criteria to determine which goals are worth
pursuing by medical means. Neil Levy has suggested
2 The Royal Dutch Medical Association recently took a stance
in this debate and argued that doctors should strongly
discourage non-medical circumcisions (see www.knmg.nl).
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to introduce an “importance of intervention test”
[28:103]. On such a test, I suspect, using DBS to
make a person happier would be rated as far less
important than using this expensive and highly skilled
technique to improve the situation of seriously
impaired and suffering patients. Who should in
practice decide about the importance of interventions
will depend on the healthcare allocation system—it
may be a government body, insurance company,
hospital or professional organization.3 Even if
patients/clients would pay for themselves, however,
the justice argument might withhold a neurosurgeon
to spend his time and skills on a non-medically
indicated intervention.
There are also some practical arguments in favor of
limiting the kind of interventions that doctors are
morally required to do. The first is that it would
simply be asking too much of doctors if they were
made responsible for all kinds of misery in the world.
It would simply be unreasonable to claim that
medicine should try to improve the quality of life in
any respect, or by any means [24]. One reason for this
is that medicine has specific skills and knowledge and
is simply not capable of improving many aspects of
quality of life. A closely related argument is that
doctors are unqualified and not trained to make
judgments or advice people about their life goals
and well-being in a broad sense. Making risk-benefit
evaluations about medical treatments may not be in
principle (on a philosophical level) very different
from making risk-benefit evaluations about other
choices in life, but in practice it is. We do not ask
doctors to advice us about what house to buy, whether
or not to undertake a dangerous but exciting
mountain-climbing trip, or whether or not to have
children. There are limits to what doctors as doctors
are knowledgeable on and have expertise in.4 This
implies that when medical means are used for non-
medical ends, the expertise of the doctor is far less
obvious and his role is less clear than in clinical
encounters. Overstepping his expertise may also have
undesirable implications for the public trust in the
profession as a whole.
Finally, there is one important point that is often
overlooked in the enhancement debate: physicians
may be morally allowed to engage in certain
activities, but this does not mean that doctors are
morally obliged to do so. I believe this is an important
distinction, which also again shows that some
interventions are more important and closer to the
heart of medicine than others. A doctor who refuses to
perform a appendectomy is different from a doctor
who refuses to perform a nose-job. Perhaps doctors
may use DBS for improving mood or enhancing
memory, but it is not at all clear that they are obliged
to do so in the same way as they are obliged to use it
for the treatment of patients with severe Parkinson’s
disease.
The Happy OCD Patient Reconsidered
I will now return to the case of the happy OCD patient
and directly address the question of whether the
psychiatrist was justified in turning the DBS off. The
arguments against the continuation of the happy OCD
patient’s DBS treatment I discussed above—that
making people feel good constitutes a kind of
enhancement and/or falls outside the goals of medicine
and should therefore not be practiced by doctors—are
not fully convincing. They leave some discretionary
room for doctors to decide about the best course of
action in specific cases.
If we look at the happy OCD patient’s case as an
‘ordinary’ case of clinical medicine, we can use the
moral principles of respect for autonomy, non-
maleficence and beneficence to help answer these
questions. Even if we consider this to be an example
of enhancement (and assume that enhancement is not
categorically wrong or prohibited) this approach
offers a useful evaluative framework.5
3 In the Netherlands, the government organization CVZ advices
on which interventions are to be covered under the basic
national health insurance; in the UK NICE has a similar
function.
4 This argument actually plays an important role in the Dutch
discussion about the role of doctors in assisted suicide for
people who are ‘tired of living’ but do not suffer from any well-
defined medical condition.
5 With regard to cognitive enhancing drugs, it has been argued
that request from patients should be evaluated by doctors
according to the same principles and along the same lines as in
the case of treatment decisions [38]. According to the American
Academy of Neurology: “Neurologists should respond to a
request for neuroenhancement as they would respond to a chief
complaint” and “the medical principles for prescribing medi-
cations for neuroenhancement are identical to those for
prescribing medications to treat medical conditions” [29: 1408]
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Happiness and Well-Being
The first question to be answered is whether continu-
ing the DBS treatment in the case of the happy OCD
patient would be an act of beneficence. Does it
contribute to her well-being or her quality of life? An
interesting aspects of the case of the happy OCD
patient is that her happiness appears to be mainly a
subjective mental state, a feeling of happiness. This
feeling is produced ‘mechanically’ as it were, by the
electrical stimulation of certain parts of her brain.6 It
can be questioned whether this feeling of happiness
can be equated with well-being, whether it can be a
true ‘vital goal’ in a person’s life, or whether it really
constitutes an ‘improvement’. The case of the happy
OCD patient makes it clear that we need to spell out
exactly we mean with these terms.
In the philosophical literature, well-being is under-
stood as the all encompassing assessment of how well
life is going for the individual whose life it is. It is
common to distinguish between three types of
theories about the nature of well-being: objective
theories, mental state theories and preference theories.
Objective theories hold that some things are good for
people whether they recognize this or agree with this
or not, and whether they desire or enjoy them or not.
Preference- or desire-theories, on the other hand, hold
that well-being is constituted by the fulfillment of a
person’s subjective preferences or desires. Most
preference theories recognize that it is too simple to
state that everything a person actually happens to
desire is therefore good for him. People can be
mistaken about what they believe will be good for
them, and the fulfillment of their actual desires can
sometimes make them worse rather than better off. On
more sophisticated accounts, therefore, preferences or
desires are required to be corrected for several
distorting factors. For example, preferences only
‘count’ if they are fully informed.
Both objective and subjective preference theories
of well-being hold that the well-being of a person
depends at least in part, on actual states of the world.
By contrast, mental state theories hold that all that
matters for well-being is the mental states of a person,
i.e. how the person himself experiences his life. In the
classical utilitarian version of hedonism, the only
intrinsically good mental states were pleasure and the
absence of pain. In contemporary theories these are
sometimes replaced with notions like enjoyment,
happiness or satisfaction, and the absence of suffer-
ing, but they still refer exclusively to internal mental
states of the person. According to hedonism, the
happiness of the OCD patient would really contribute
to her well-being. Feeling happy, tranquil, satisfied or
blissful, would make her life better, even if these
feelings were caused by the DBS and not by any real
state-of-the world.
This account of well-being has received strong
criticism, however. One of the most famous critiques
is especially suitable for the case under consideration.
In a thought experiment know as the Experience
Machine, Robert Nozick [30] asks his readers to
imagine a machine that can be directly attached to the
brain and can provide any kind of experience one
wants. Would people choose to be hooked on to such
a machine for the rest of their lives, guaranteeing a
life consisting of their preferred experiences? Accord-
ing to Nozick, people would not want this, because
they do not only want to experience certain things but
also to do things, to be a certain kind of person and to
live in contact with reality. With this thought
experiment Nozick aims to show that it is not merely
good or happy experiences that make life worthwhile;
real well-being is not only ‘in the mind’ but also ‘in
the world’. As compared to the experience machine, a
DBS system with happiness-inducing parameters is a
rather crude and simple device. It does not give one
full-fledged experiences but merely a certain feeling
or emotional state; in this sense it may be compared
with certain drugs that enhance mood. Nozick’s
critique still holds, though (and may actually even
be stronger with regard to feeling happy as opposed to
having certain fulfilling experiences): well-being is
not merely constituted by mental states but should
have a relation with states of the world.
A different way to make the same point would be
to say that happiness is only true or meaningful if it is
a reasonable reaction to one’s circumstances in the
6 It may be argued that this feeling of happiness as reported by
the patient is actually a symptom of mania. Manic symptoms
are a known side effect in patients who are treated with DBS
for Parkinson’s disease. Enhanced mood may also be inter-
preted as the improvement of co-morbid depression. However,
by interpreting her feelings in this way, they are turned into
pathology, which makes it easier to dismiss them. It seems quite
possible, however, that DBS would elevate one’s mood without
turning into full-blown mania.
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real world. In other words, if it has a reason and not
merely a cause—be it chemicals, electrical impulses,
magnetic fields or other mechanical devices (cf [31]).
In the case of the happy OCD patient, her
emotional state clearly had no relationship to her real
condition in the world. Her symptoms had not
diminished but apparently they were felt to be less
bothersome or invalidating than before. On an
objective evaluation, however, she was probably still
as incapacitated by her compulsions as before. If her
compulsions and obsessions still kept her, for in-
stance, from getting a job, from maintaining mean-
ingful relationships, or from engaging in otherwise
meaningful activities, one could argue that her well-
being had not really improved—even if she felt much
better.
A purely objective evaluation, however, leaves too
little room for the patient’s own point of view. A more
convincing and helpful theory, which combines
preference theory and hedonism, is the authentic
happiness account of Sumner [32]. Well-being,
according to Sumner, consists in “authentic happi-
ness”, understood as the informed and autonomous
judgments of people about their own life-satisfaction
and fulfillment. The term happiness must be under-
stood very broadly here, as overall life satisfaction,
not as a subjective feeling of happiness. Being happy,
according to Sumner, means having a certain kind of
positive attitude towards your life, which has both a
cognitive and affective component. The cognitive
aspect of happiness consists in a positive evaluation—
an affirmation or endorsement—of the conditions and
circumstances of your life; “a judgement that, on
balance, your life is going well for you” [32:145]. But
there is also an affective component: you must also
experience your life as satisfying or fulfilling.
According to Sumner, a person’s own account of her
overall life satisfaction is not infallible but can need
correction. “The theory I defend does not simply
identify well-being with happiness; additionally, it
requires that the subject’s endorsement of the con-
ditions of her life, or her experience of them as
satisfying or fulfilling, be authentic” [32:139]. The
conditions for authenticity, in turn, are twofold: being
informed on the true conditions of your life, and
having values and goals that are truly your own.
On this account it is unlikely, although not
impossible, that the DBS treatment enhances the
happy OCD patients well-being. If she is informed
of the fact that her happy mood is caused by the DBS
and is aware of the fact that her compulsions and the
impairments they cause have actually not diminished,
she is likely to conclude that this does not really
contribute to her life’s satisfaction. Living with a
DBS-caused happy mood but without freedom from
her compulsions seems like living an illusion. In
terms of Nordenfelt’s account of health, one could say
that such a condition could not reasonably belong to a
person’s ‘vital goals’ in life.
It is, however, not completely unthinkable that the
happy OCD patient might prefer the DBS to continue
anyhow, because for her the alternative of being both
disabled and depressed and anxious due to her
disorder, may be even worse. If she is well informed
and her over-all judgment is that her life goes better
for her with the DBS than without it, it must be
concluded that it does enhance her well-being.7 There
may be cases in which ‘artificial’ happiness is to be
preferred over realistic misery. Assuming that all
alternatives had been exhausted, and all risks and side
effects taken into account, wouldn’t it be paternalistic
of the doctor to say that the patient ought to continue
to suffer, because he beliefs the DBS induced happy
state is not valuable enough?
Autonomy and Paternalism
A possible argument in favor of continuing the DBS
in the happy OCD patient draws on respect for
autonomy. It states that the doctor ought to continue
the DBS because of the patient’s own request. But
would this really mean the doctor has to comply with
the patient’s demand? Not necessarily.
First of all, it could be argued that the request of
the happy OCD patient was not really autonomous,
and therefore need not be respected. Since DBS
influences brain function it may also affect the
cognitive and affective capacities that are necessary
to make a sound judgment, and it can therefore affect
7 The only way to avoid this conclusion would be to deny that
her values and goals are truly hers, either because they were
influenced by the desperate state caused by her disorder, or
directly, by the DBS treatment. I do not belief that adapting
one’s goals and preferences to one’s disorder makes these goals
in-authentic or non-autonomous; that would set requirements
for autonomous preference formation too high. I’ll come back
to the influence of the DBS on preference formation in the next
section.
442 M. Schermer
the capacity for autonomous choice. As in the case of
the Parkinson patient described by Leentjes [33] and
discussed by Glannon [8], the DBS treatment might
render the patient incompetent to decide. From the
case description it is not obvious that the patient
lacked cognitive capacities, however. If we assume
that the happy OCD patient was able to understand
and weigh the relevant information and to base her
decision on it, then on many accounts of competence,
she would be considered competent to decide.
However, in this special case we should also
consider whether the elevated mood and her more
positive outlook induced by the DBS might have a
negative impact on her competence to decide. The
changes brought about by the DBS might influence
her preferences and her outlook in such a way that
they should be considered inauthentic—not really
hers.8 This, in turn, would undermine her autonomy
and the autonomy of her choice.
This point touches upon a whole philosophical
discussion regarding the autonomy and authenticity of
changes in personality and identity. Here, I will not go
into that debate in too much detail, but I will follow
the lines of argument set out by DeGrazia and Bublitz
and Merkel [34–36]. This implies that changes in
personality traits, or outlook on life, can be deemed
authentic and autonomous if the person in question
herself identifies with her new traits, that is: is
positive about the changes in her personality, and is
aware of the way in which they have come about and
approves of this. So, she must not be forced or
unknowingly manipulated into these new traits, but
understand their genesis. If she identifies with her
new traits or outlook, they are authentic and choices
and actions based on them are autonomous. Accord-
ing to Bublizt and Merkel, and DeGrazia, this implies
that a person’s retrospective judgement of changes in
her personality traits or outlook on life is authorita-
tive, not her prospective judgement.9 I tend to agree
with this point of view. Of course, in practice it would
be reassuring if the patient would approve of the
changes both before and after they occurred, or with
the DBS on and off, but for autonomy it would
suffice if she identified with them afterwards. It
follows that under these conditions the happy OCD
patient’s desire to have the DBS continue can be
considered autonomous and, assuming her cognitive
capacities were sufficient, she would be competent to
decide about continuation of the treatment.
Secondly, however, even a request of a competent
patient is not in itself sufficient to perform or continue
a treatment. Respect for autonomy does not support a
‘claim right’ but is intended to protect the patient
from unwanted intrusions. An autonomous patient’s
wish is not by itself enough reason for the doctor to
act—that would turn the doctor into a mere means for
the satisfaction of the patient’s desires. The doctor has
his own professional responsibility to use his skills
and knowledge responsibly and in the best interest of
the patient; as discussed above, the doctor also has
some discretionary space to decide where he draws
the line with regard to the goals of medicine and his
professional duties.
Conclusion
The case of the happy OCD patient raises questions
about the moral justification of continuing or stopping
a treatment that has unexpected side effects on the
psychological state of the patient, that are actually
welcomed by the patient—even though the symptoms
of the disorder have not decreased. Although a final
assessment can of course only be made with full
information about the details of the particular situa-
tion, in general it can be argued that discontinuing the
treatment seems justified. Mood enhancement brought
about by DBS does, in most cases, not really improve
well-being (understood as the all encompassing
assessment of how well a life is going for the person
whose life it is). The fact that DBS can affect both
affective and cognitive brain functions is a reason to
carefully assess the competence of the patient who
makes such a request, but the mere change in mood or
outlook does not necessarily cause incompetence, I
have argued. Moreover, because there is reasonable
doubt about the limits of medicine in this case the
doctor can use his own view on his professional role
8 Note that on the account of well-being that I have used, this
would also undermine the claim that she was really (authenti-
cally) happy. If her values and goals were influences by the
DBS in such a way that they were not ‘really her own’
anymore, this would affect her own evaluation of her life as a
whole in a way that would make it ‘inauthentic’, according to
Sumner. That would imply the DBS did not really improve her
well-being.
9 In Merkel et al. [37] it is argued that personality changes can
only be deemed authentic if the patient approves of them before
the change takes place, so prospectively.
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and obligations (‘making people feel better without
actually treating their symptoms or disease goes
beyond the limits of my professional goals’). Finally,
beyond the individual doctor-patient relationship,
trust in the medical system could be compromised if
doctors started to do things that seem so obviously out
of line with their usual business—especially with an
experimental treatment.
A second issue raised by the case of the happy
OCD patient is whether DBS should ever be used for
purposes of enhancing healthy people. While the
analysis of the effects of mood enhancement by DBS
on overall well-being casts doubt on the possibilities
for DBS to improve or enhance people by affecting
their mood, it is not completely impossible that DBS
may contribute to enhancement in other ways (e.g.
improving certain cognitive capacities or personality
traits). I have argued that it is not self-evident that
enhancement falls outside the goals of medicine, if we
agree that medicine should aim at well-being, quality
of life, or fulfilling vital goals. Moreover, the goals of
medicine do not function as a static set of aims and
limits, but as a normative framework for discussing
what we as a society want and expect doctors to do.
This could well come to include certain enhancements
(like cosmetic surgery), but there are some good
reasons for limiting the kind of things doctors are
required or allowed to do. These include moral
reasons such as the best interest of the patient, and
justice with regard to the use of scarce medical
resources, but also more pragmatic reasons such as
the limits of medical knowledge and expertise.
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